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Abstract. Minimum capital regulations play a central role in 
banking regulation. Regulators require banks to maintain 
capital above a certain level in order to correct incentives to 
make excessively risky loans and investments. However, it has 
never been clear how regulators determine how high or low the 
minimum capital-asset ratio should be. An examination of U.S. 
regulators’ justifications for five regulations issued over more 
than 30 years reveals that regulators have never performed (or 
at least disclosed) a serious economic analysis that would justify 
the levels that they chose. Instead, regulators appear to have 
followed a practice of what I call “norming”—incremental 
change designed to weed out a handful of outlier banks. This 
approach resulted in a significant regulatory failure because it 
could not have given, and did not give, banks an adequate 
incentive to increase capital. The failure of banking regulators 
to use cost-benefit analysis in order to determine capital 
requirements may therefore have contributed to the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 One of the central concepts in banking regulation is capital 
adequacy. Capital adequacy refers to the extent to which the assets of 
a bank exceed its liabilities, and is thus a measure of the ability of the 
bank to withstand a financial loss. Bank regulators care about capital 
adequacy because their mandate is to prevent bank panics and 
contagions. A bank with a high ratio of capital to assets will, all else 
equal, be better able to withstand a sudden loss than a bank with a 
low capital-asset ratio. As a result, such a bank is less likely to be 
thrown into insolvency or subject to a run. 
 
 Financial regulators have always focused on capital adequacy, 
but regulations have evolved considerably over the years. From 
World War II until the early 1980s, regulators treated capital 
adequacy as just one factor in their evaluations of the overall health 
of a bank. They did not formulate specific capital adequacy rules—
such as minimum ratios—and different regulators used different 
definitions of capital adequacy. In response to problems in the 
banking system in the 1970s, regulators began to think about capital 
adequacy more carefully. This led to four related developments. First, 
regulators developed specific capital-adequacy rules to replace the 
vague standards under which capital adequacy was treated as just 
one factor among many. Second, regulators developed more specific 
definitions of capital adequacy. Third, over time regulators adopted 
increasingly strict minimum capital-asset ratios. Fourth, the different 
bank regulators began to coordinate their approaches to regulating 
capital. 
 
 These developments were related. Rules were used to spur 
banks to raise capital, but the process of drafting rules required 
regulators to think carefully about how to treat different types of 
assets and liabilities for the purpose of determining capital-asset 
requirements. And as regulators moved from vague standards to 
bright-line rules, inconsistencies between their approaches became 
too obvious to ignore. Because banks can, within limits, move from 
one regulator to another by rechartering, regulators face pressure to 
act consistently.1 
1 See Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Competition in the US Federal System: 
Banking and Financial Services, in Regulatory Competition and Economic 
Integration: Comparative Perspectives, at 95 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin 
eds., 2001) (describing banks’ options among different regulators). 
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 A further consequence of the move to rule-based regulation is 
that it became necessary for regulators to provide public 
justifications for the rules that they adopted. As we will see, most of 
these justifications were terse, opaque, and laden with boilerplate. As 
a result, the reasoning behind those rules was unclear. The only clear 
idea that emerges from an examination of the regulatory documents 
is that the regulators believed that the regulations would affect very 
few banks, on the order of 5 percent or fewer. Thus, a major theme 
that emerges is that regulators defended their regulations in part on 
the grounds that those regulations did not inflict costs on most 
banks. 
 
 While most regulatory agencies in the executive branch are 
required to issue cost-benefit analyses along with regulations, the 
bank regulators rarely did so, and the cost-benefit analyses that they 
did issue were badly executed.2 Only in 2011 was a high-quality cost-
benefit analysis prepared—by an international organization, not by 
U.S. regulators—and it showed that capital requirements should have 
been much higher than they ever were. Most economists appear to 
share this view, and many commentators have blamed the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 on inadequate capitalization of banks. 
Accordingly, the history of capital adequacy regulation raises an 
interesting possibility—that if bank regulators had used cost-benefit 
analysis from the start, the 2007-2008 financial crisis would have 
not taken place or (more likely) been less severe. 
 
 If bank regulators did not engage in cost-benefit analysis, 
what decision-procedure did they use to formulate capital adequacy 
requirements? I will argue that the best theory for the regulators 
choices’ is what I will call “norming.” Norming, as I use the term, 
means choosing a regulatory standard that permits the mean or 
modal behavior of regulated entities, and only rules out outliers at 
the low end. As a consequence, norming imposes zero costs on most 
banks and requires a change of behavior only in the weakest banks, 
which must either raise capital or go out of business. 
 
 After describing the process of norming in bank regulation, I 
discuss why it might have been an attractive approach for bank 
regulators. Norming is a restrained style of regulation that causes no 
harm to most regulated entities and thus minimizes political 
2 See discussion in Part II, infra. 
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opposition to the regulation. Indeed, norming may benefit most 
regulated entities by eliminating competitors. For just this reason, 
norming is a highly questionable approach to regulation since 
regulation is supposed to counter externalities and the average 
regulated entity imposes externalities. 
 
If this is true, then the case for cost-benefit analysis of 
financial regulations is stronger than its critics acknowledge.3 This 
argument also should help put to rest the claim that cost-benefit 
analysis is inherently deregulatory, a claim that has frequently been 
made by critics of cost-benefit analysis, who blame it for 
undermining environmental, health, and safety regulation.4 
 
 The plan is as follows. In part I, I provide some background on 
capital adequacy regulations. They are designed to counter a market 
failure that is associated with financial intermediation, the major 
economic function of banks. In part II, I describe the history of those 
regulations, including the justifications that regulators provided and 
the effects of those regulations on the behavior of banks. I focus on 
the major changes to those regulations, which took place in 1981, 
1985, 1989, 2007, and 2013. An important theme of this discussion is 
that regulators believed that the capital regulations before 2013 
would not affect most banks, and the evidence suggests that their 
belief was correct. Although capital-asset ratios gradually rose over 
the decades, the evidence suggests that they rose in response to 
market forces rather than to the regulations.5 In part III, I discuss 
more broadly the advantages and disadvantages of norming as a 
3 See John C. Coates, IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case 
Studies and Implications, Yale L.J. (forthcoming) (criticizing cost-benefit analysis 
of financial regulations); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming) (same). For defenses of cost-benefit analysis 
of financial regulation, see Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for 
Financial Regulation, 103 Amer. Econ. Rev. Pap. & Proc. 393 (2013) (defending 
cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, 
Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming, 2014) 
(same); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial 
Regulations: A Response to Criticisms, Yale L.J. F. (forthcoming, 2014) 
(responding to Coates and Gordon). 
4 See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of 
Everything and the Value Of Nothing (2005); Thomas McGarrity, Freedom to 
Harm: The Lasting Legacy of the Laissez Faire Revival (2013). 
5 See, e.g., Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, & Robert Marquez, Credit Market 
Competition and Capital Regulation, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 873 (2011) (explaining that 
banks may raise capital in order to reduce the cost of debt when creditors worry 
that the banks are too risky). 
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strategy for regulating the financial industry. Norming can in theory 
be given a policy justification, but a better explanation is that it is an 
excuse for regulatory failure in the face of entrenched industry 
opposition. 
 
 
I. CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATIONS: THEIR PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE 
 
 The theory of bank regulation is based on the risks that banks 
pose to the economy. Banks are financial intermediaries 
characterized by a liquidity mismatch between the asset and liability 
side of the balance sheet. On the asset side, banks usually hold a 
large number of long-term, customized loans. If the bank must 
quickly raise capital, it can sell these loans, but because the loans are 
illiquid, the bank will have to sell them at a deep discount from their 
face value.6 Consider a $100,000 five-year loan to an automaker, or a 
$200,000 30-year mortgage to a homeowner. These loans are 
unique products. The market value of the loans—the price that a 
third party will pay for them—is a function of many variables, 
including the probability that the loan will be paid in full, and the 
value of underlying assets in case it is not. The probability that the 
automaker will pay its loan depends on all kinds of factors—how 
good management is, for example. The probability that the mortgage 
will be paid depends on the income, honesty, and competence of the 
borrower, plus the value of the house at the time of default if default 
strikes. The bank possesses inside information about these factors 
that is not accessible to potential buyers. The buyers will need to 
satisfy themselves by investigating the loans, but that takes time, so if 
the bank needs to sell the loan quickly, it can do so only at a discount. 
 
 On the liability side, banks typically hold a large amount of 
highly liquid debt—above all, demand deposits (checking accounts). 
Customers lend money to the bank by depositing cash or checks or 
other financial instruments with it, and have the right to withdraw 
any or all of their money at any time without notice. Normally, 
customers withdraw money at about the same rate that they deposit 
it, so the pool of liquid liability remains constant. That means the 
bank can safely lend it out in the form of illiquid loans. But from time 
to time, customers may withdraw their money en masse. They may 
do so because of a severe economic downturn, rumors about the 
6 See Rustom Irani et al., Loan Sales and Bank Liquidity Risk Management: 
Evidence from the Shared National Credit Program 38 (unpub. m.s. 2014). 
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bank’s solvency, or other random factors. This is called a run. If a run 
starts, the bank has few choices. It can sell off assets at a discount, 
but risk insolvency. It may be able to borrow from another bank long 
enough to reassure customers. But there is a good chance that the 
bank will fail. 
 
 A bank failure by itself is not necessarily a problem that calls 
for government intervention. In principle, depositors and other 
creditors will be compensated for the risk of bank failure in the form 
of interest and other consideration.7 Bank failure is a problem for the 
government because of the risk of contagion.8 Banks lend money to 
each other, so if one bank fails, other banks may fail as well. If many 
banks fail, then businesses that depend on credit (as most do) will 
have trouble obtaining credit, and many of those businesses will fail, 
throwing employees out of work. While in principle investors could 
create new banks to replace the old ones, or surviving banks could 
expand their lending in order to compensate for bank failures, the 
collapse of existing banks results in destruction of non-recoverable 
value because information about borrowers is lost, and relationships 
are destroyed.9 Consumers will also not be able to borrow in order to 
finance the purchase of houses, cars, and other items, and this will 
further exacerbate the economic downturn. Moreover, banks play a 
vital role in the payments system, so that widespread bank collapse 
would interfere with the transmission of money from one person to 
another. Financial crises in this way can cause general economic 
collapse. 
 
 Bank failures occur in many ways, and not just through the 
classic run by depositors. During the financial crisis of 2007-2008, 
the major type of asset that caused problems was not the customized 
loan but collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). While CDOs were 
designed to be tradable and hence liquid, problems arose because of 
their immense complexity. Their value was tied to thousands of 
underlying mortgages. When housing prices started to decline, 
investors discovered that their assumptions about the value of the 
underlying mortgages, and hence about the value of CDOs, were 
incorrect, and so they could no longer determine the value of the 
7 This statement does not apply to depositors who receive insurance, an issue to 
which I will return shortly. 
8 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 401, 415 (1983). 
9 See Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the 
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 Amer. Econ. Rev. 257 (1983). 
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CDOs. Banks could thus not sell their CDOs in order to raise cash 
except at huge discounts. Meanwhile, many large banks obtained 
financing through the repo market, where they offered CDOs and 
other securities as collateral for short-term (one- or two-day) loans 
from pension funds and other large institutions. The lenders stopped 
accepting CDOs as collateral (or required increasingly large 
haircuts), and thus the banks could no longer borrow in short-term 
markets. If forced to sell off CDOs at prevailing panic-driven prices, 
they would have been driven into insolvency (as some were).10 
 
 To prevent or mitigate financial panics, the government offers 
two types of insurance. First, FDIC insurance protects depositors up 
to $250,000.11 Second, the Fed stands as lender of last resort, and 
provides loans to any bank (and other types of financial institution) 
that suffers a run during a financial crisis.12 Although only FDIC 
insurance is given the formal name of “insurance,” lender-of-last 
resort lending is functionally insurance as well. Insurance should 
discourage depositors from withdrawing money, or other creditors 
from failing to roll over short-term loans, based on a false rumor or 
worry about the economy, but it also suppresses creditors’ incentives 
to monitor banks and ensure that they are safe before lending to 
them. Thus, insurance of both types give banks an incentive (known 
as “moral hazard”) to make risky loans and other investments. They 
enjoy all the upside, while the downside is absorbed at least partly by 
the government insurance system.13 
 
 Even if deposit insurance and emergency lending did not 
create perverse incentives, banks would still have incentives to take 
excessive risk by maintaining too little capital given their portfolio of 
assets relative to the social optimum. The reason is that a bank and 
its creditors (to the extent they are able to engage in adequate 
monitoring of bank risk-taking) do not take into account the costs of 
bank failure to other banks in the financial system. If one bank fails, 
then creditors of another bank may run because they believe that the 
second bank has made loans to the first bank and will not be able to 
10 See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand __ (). Note that many of 
the institutions caught in this squeeze were investment banks rather than 
commercial banks. 
11 Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E). 
12 Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 347a. 
13 The vast literature on the lender-of-last-resort function of central banks is too 
large to cite; see, e.g., Financial Crises, Contagion, and the Lender of Last Resort: A 
Reader (Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Illing eds. 2002). 
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recover them; or fear that whatever caused the first bank to fail (such 
as adverse economic conditions) will also cause the second bank to 
fail.14 If panic spreads and contagion results, a general financial crisis 
will occur that will harm not only bank shareholders and creditors 
but people who would benefit from borrowing but no longer can as a 
result of the loss of liquidity throughout the system. 
 
 Bank regulation tries to counter these incentives. Its overall 
purpose is to ensure that banks operate in a “safe and sound” way. 
This means that the banks are not permitted to take excessive risks. 
Regulation takes many forms. The FDIC charges a higher premium 
to risky banks.15 The bank regulators also limit the lines of business 
that banks may enter, the size of loans, and so on.16 But the focus of 
all these efforts is the capital-asset ratio. Generally speaking, banks 
with higher capital-asset ratios are given more freedom to manage 
their portfolios than other banks. Banks with low capital-asset ratios 
may be shut down. 
 
 To understand the significance of the capital-asset ratio, 
consider the hypothetical bank balance sheet in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: A Hypothetical Bank Balance Sheet 
 
Assets    Liabilities                        
$100 in loans  $95 in demand deposits 
     $5 in common equity 
 
This bank is solvent because its assets are worth more than its 
liabilities. The capital-asset ratio is 5% ($5 / $100), which tells the 
regulator that if the value of the assets decline by more than 5%, the 
bank will become insolvent. Thus, the capital-asset ratio is a measure 
of how robust a bank is against market shocks. Suppose, for example, 
that interest rates rise, with the result that the value of the bank’s 
14 See Phillippe Aghion et al., Contagious Bank Failures in a Free Banking System, 
44 Eur. Econ. Rev. 718 (1999). 
15 See Assessment Pricing Methods, 12 C.F.R. §§ 327.4, 327.9. Most academics 
believe that the FDIC does not price risk accurately. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et 
al., Systemic Risk and Deposit Insurance Premiums, unpub. m.s. 2009, at 4-6, 
available at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/fdic_epr.pdf 
(describing ways that FDIC insurance falls short of providing banks with optimal 
incentives). 
16 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 32.1. 
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loan portfolio falls to $98. Now the bank has equity of $3, and its 
capital-asset ratio is approximately 3% ($3 / $98). The regulator 
would likely demand that the bank raise capital by issuing new 
shares to investors. If investors pay $4 for new shares, the bank now 
has assets of $102 ($98 plus $4 in cash from the investors), equity of 
$7 ($102-$95), and a healthy capital-asset ratio of almost 7%. 
 
 The major effect of a high level of capital relative to assets is to 
reduce the incentive to take risks.17 If a bank has very low equity, its 
shareholders have little to lose by taking risks. If the risk turns out 
well, the shareholders make a profit; if it does not, the bank’s 
creditors (and the government) absorbs the loss. By requiring banks 
to hold more capital, the government puts more of the risk on the 
shareholders. If investments go sour, the shareholders lose more 
money.18 
 
 How high capital ratios should be is a complex question. Some 
scholars believe that they should be very high, as high as 50 
percent.19 Their reasons are derived from the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem, which provides that the value of a firm is independent of its 
mix of debt and equity.20 If this theorem is correct, then there is no 
economic cost from forcing banks to hold equity. Banks hold much 
more debt than ordinary firms, and the likely explanation is that the 
debt is implicitly subsidized by the government. However, the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem is an abstraction—a useful starting point 
for thinking about capital structure, not a description of the world. 
Among other things, it assumes (counterfactually) the absence of 
taxes, zero costs from bankruptcy, and an efficient capital market. In 
17 Higher capital holdings also increase bank performance during a financial crisis 
and decrease the possibility of bank failure. See Allen N. Berger & Christa H.S. 
Bouwman, How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises?, 
109 J. Fin. Econ. 146, 149-150 (2013). 
18 See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s 
Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It 108 (2013), for a lucid exposition; 
and Anat R. Admati, et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion 
of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially Expensive, Rock Center for 
Corporate Governance, Working Paper Series No. 161 (2013), for a shorter and 
updated version. 
19 See Interview with Eugene Fama, http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-
cassidy/interview-with-eugene-fama (last visited Aug. 24, 2014); John H. 
Cochrane, The More Bank Capital, the Safer the Bank, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230491110457644448244
0753132, (last visited Aug 24, 2014); Admati & Hellwig, supra note __. 
20 Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 268 (1958). 
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the real world, there may well be costs from raising equity rather 
than debt.21 In addition, people obviously value demand deposits; if 
banks were required to hold a huge amount of equity, then checking 
accounts would become scarcer and more expensive.22 The 
magnitude of these costs is an empirical question. 
 
 Nonetheless, many economists have converged on the view 
that high capital-asset ratios would be socially beneficial.23 But this 
raises an additional set of issues regarding how exactly the ratio 
should be defined. First, not all assets are the same. Some loans are 
riskier than others. When market conditions decline, risky loans may 
default while safe loans do not. Regulators want to distinguish banks 
with risky loans and banks with safe loans because banks with risky 
loans are more likely to collapse in response to adverse market 
conditions even if both types of banks have the same capital-asset 
ratio. Another way to see this is that banks could undermine the 
effect of a higher capital requirement by selling low-risk assets and 
replacing them with high-risk assets.24 To prevent banks from doing 
this, one must adjust the ratio for the quality of the assets. Regulators 
use a system of risk-weighting, to be discussed below.25 
21 A standard view is that debt may have value for corporate governance purposes. 
See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305. 
Another view is that issuing equity can be a negative signal of a firm’s financial 
health. See Myers & Majluf, Corporate Finance and Investment Decisions When 
Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. Fin. Econ. 187, 208 
(1984). 
22 See Harry DeAngelo & René Stulz, Liquid-Claim Production, Risk Management, 
and Bank Capital Structure: Why High Leverage is Optimal for Banks, ECGI – 
Finance Working Paper No. 356 at 36 (May 14, 2014). For discussion and criticism 
of DeAngelo & Stulz, see Admati et al., supra note __, at 37-40. 
23 See Admati & Hellwig, supra note __; Mathias Dewatripont, et al., Rebalancing 
the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis 96 (2010); Darrell Duffie, How 
Big Banks Fail and What to Do about It 55 (2010); Heidi M. Schooner and Michael 
W. Taylor, Global Bank Regulation: Principles and Policies (2009); Gary B. Gorton, 
Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming (2012); 
Roger B. Myerson, Rethinking the Principles of Bank Regulation: A Review of 
Admati and Hellwig’s The Bankers’ New Clothes, 52 J. Econ. Lit. 197, 209 (2014). 
But see James R. Barth et al., Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for 
Us 193 (2012) (“a system based on imposing required capital ratios … not only 
encourages shadow banking, but raising those capital requirements, as discussed 
below, increases the incentives for banks to move risky assets into off-balance 
sheet entities.”). 
24 See Daesik Kim & Anthony M. Santomero, Risk in Banking and Capital 
Regulation, 43 J. Fin. 1219, 1231 (1988). 
25 See infra note __. 
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 Second, not all debt is the same. Demand deposits pose a 
threat to banks because depositors can withdraw their money quickly 
and without notice, depleting the vault cash of the bank and possibly 
forcing it to sell illiquid assets at fire-sale prices or to pay a high rate 
of interest for an emergency loan from another bank or from the Fed. 
Long-term debt is less risky for a bank because the bank can 
gradually sell assets to meet obligations as they become due. Other 
forms of debt and quasi-debt, like preferred equity, also are less risky 
because they become due only if there is ample resources to pay 
short-term debt. Because the simple capital-asset ratio does not 
distinguish between different types of debt and equity, it can give a 
misleading impression of the vulnerability of banks with different 
capital structures. Regulators address this problem by allowing 
banks to treat the safest forms of debt as equity for purposes of 
calculating the capital-asset ratio under some circumstances.26 
 
 Third, the simple capital-asset ratio disregards off-balance 
sheet obligations like loan commitments and standby letters of 
credit. Suppose the bank in Figure 1 enters into a contract with a 
customer to issue a $20 loan to it in one year. That loan will not 
appear on the balance sheet until it is issued. When it does, the 
bank’s capital-asset ratio may fall, depending on how the bank raises 
capital to make that loan. A bank with many loan commitments is 
thus riskier than a bank without them, yet this difference will not 
appear in their capital-asset ratios. Regulators have addressed this 
problem by requiring banks to translate off-balance sheet 
commitments into appropriately weighted liabilities for purposes of 
calculating the capital-asset ratio.27 
 
 In sum, financial intermediation causes negative externalities 
in the form of systemic risk. Government insurance helps mitigate 
the risk of a financial panic but also creates moral hazard. Capital 
regulation counters both this moral hazard and the excessive level of 
risk-taking that is inherent in financial intermediation. But while 
there is little debate that capital requirements are the appropriate 
regulatory response as a matter of theory, economists have debated 
the level and the form of optimal capital requirements. 
 
 
26 See infra note __. 
27 See infra note __. 
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II. THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY  
REGULATION BY U.S. REGULATORS 
 
 In this part, I provide a brief and necessarily incomplete 
history of capital-adequacy regulation.28 To keep this paper within 
manageable bounds, I disregard state regulation of banks, federal 
regulation of financial institutions other than commercial banks, and 
regulation of bank-like institutions like thrifts. Thus, I focus on 
federal regulation of commercial banks, and hence emphasize the 
activities of the major federal bank regulators—the Federal Reserve 
(the Fed), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). While the 
jurisdictions of these agencies overlap a great deal, generally 
speaking the OCC regulates nationally chartered banks, the Fed 
regulates bank holding companies and state banks that belong to the 
Federal Reserve System, and the FDIC regulates other state banks 
that are members of the FDIC. 
 
A. From World War II to the 1970s 
 
 This period is a prehistory of capital-adequacy regulation. The 
financial regulators did not require banks to satisfy any specific 
minimum capital rule. Instead, regulators applied a general “safety 
and soundness” standard to all banks. Capital adequacy was only one 
of many indicators that regulators looked at in order to determine 
whether a bank was healthy.29 Regulators would consider the 
riskiness of assets, the quality of management, earnings, the size of 
the bank, among other things, and then make an all-things-
considered-judgment as to whether a bank was in regulatory 
compliance. 
 
 Because capital adequacy was just one factor among others 
used to generate an overall assessment of a bank’s financial healthy, 
regulators were not always specific about how they defined the 
relevant components of the capital adequacy ratio—assets, liabilities, 
and so on—and they did not try very hard to coordinate with each 
28 For a brief, useful overview up to 1988, see Malcolm C. Alfriend, International 
Risk-Based Capital Standard: History and Explanation, 74 Fed. Res. Bank of 
Richmond Econ. Rev. 28 (Nov./Dec. 1988). 
29 Alfriend, supra note __, at 29; Daniel K. Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future 
of International Financial Regulation 29-35 (2008). 
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other. Each regulator applied a different standard to the banks under 
its jurisdiction.30 
 
 The period from World War II to the late 1960s one was of 
unusual stability in the banking system. While regulatory supervision 
no doubt played a role, the usual explanation is that the United 
States experienced low inflation and steady economic growth.31 
Banks were also barred from risky financial activities and protected 
from competition by heavy restrictions on branching, significant 
chartering requirements, and rules that barred them from charging a 
market rate of interest on deposits.32 Thus, managers may have 
exercised caution because banks earned monopoly rents that they 
would lose if their bank failed. 
 
B. The Modern Regulatory Era 
 
 In the 1970s, the sleepy era of banking came to an end. High 
inflation and low economic growth squeezed banks. Because of high 
inflation, depositors demanded interest on deposits, but banks were 
limited in what they could offer. Because of low economic growth, 
demand for credit fell. Meanwhile, deregulation in the banking 
industry reduced the monopoly rents enjoyed by owners of a bank 
charter. Notably, money market mutual funds were allowed to offer 
interest in return for short-term deposits with checking privileges, 
and they attracted billions of dollars of deposits from banks.33  A 
number of banks failed during this period, and the capital-asset ratio 
of most banks declined. Alarmed by this turn of events, the three 
regulators agreed to try to coordinate on regulation, and to reverse 
the decline of capital in the banking system. In 1981, they issued a 
(partially) coordinated rule governing capital adequacy.34 
 
 One major feature of this rule was the division of capital into 
“primary” and “secondary” versions. Primary capital included 
common stock, certain reserves, and preferred stock with sufficiently 
30 Tarullo, supra note __, at 29-35. 
31 See Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, Fragile by Design: The Political 
Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit __ (2014). 
32 See generally Banking Act of 1933 (“Glass-Steagall Act”), Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 
162 (June 16 1933). 
33 Calomiris & Huber, Fragile by Design __, supra note __. 
34 Statement of Policy on Capital Adequacy, 46 Fed. Reg. 62693-02 (FDIC Dec. 28, 
1981); Capital Adequacy Guidelines, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 33 (Fed and OCC Jan. 1, 
1982). 
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long maturity. Secondary capital included other forms of preferred 
stock and subordinated debt. “Total capital” equals primary capital 
plus secondary capital. The regulators also agreed to create separate 
rules for regional banks (assets between $1 billion and $15 billion)—
which were large and diversified—and community banks (assets 
below $1 billion).35 Table 1 provides a summary.36 
 
Table 1: 1981 Minimum Capital Regulations 
 
 Regional Banks Community Banks 
Primary capital ratio 5% 6% 
Total capital ratio 6.5% 7% 
 
Because regional banks were more diversified than community 
banks, they were permitted a lower level of capital. Banks that fell 
below these floors were not shut down immediately but subjected to 
increasingly greater obligations to manage risk and raise capital as 
their capital-asset ratios fell.37 
 
 In 1983, Congress passed The International Lending 
Supervision Act.38 This statute directed the banking regulators to 
“achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum 
levels of capital for” the banks that they regulate.39 The ILSA was 
enacted in response to the Latin American debt crisis, which revealed 
that some U.S. banks were dangerously exposed to risky foreign 
sovereign debt. The law also put on firmer footing the regulators’ 
authority to issue capital adequacy rules.40 The regulators used this 
opportunity to simplify capital requirements. The distinction 
35 Large multinational banks, with assets greater than $15 billion, were subjected to 
a 5% floor in 1983. See FRB Minimum Capital Guidelines: Amendments, 69 Fed. 
Res. Bull. 539 (July 1, 1983). 
36 Capital Adequacy Guidelines, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 34.  
37 The FDIC used a slightly different system. It tried to take account of the riskiness 
of assets and the different types of equity, but otherwise the approach and numbers 
were similar. See FDIC Statement of Policy on Capital Adequacy, 46 Fed. Reg. at 
62694, supra note __ (“When the adjusted equity capital ratio falls below this 
level, the Corporation will insist on a specific program for remedying the equity 
capital deficiency promptly.”). 
38 Pub. L. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1278 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3901-12). 
39 Id. at 1280 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907). 
40 An OCC order requiring a bank to raise capital was vacated by a court in First 
National Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
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between community and regional banks was discarded. Table 2 
summarizes the new system. 
 
 
Table 2: 1985 Minimum Capital Regulations 
 
Primary capital ratio 5.5% 
Total capital ratio 6% 
 
The regulators increased the primary capital ratio for regional banks 
from 5% to 5.5%, and reduced it from 6% to 5.5% for community 
banks. The regulators reduced the total capital ratio for regional 
banks from 6.5% to 6%, and for community banks from 7% to 6%. 
 
 The next major round of changes took place starting in 1989. 
The stimulus this time was the globalization of the financial system, 
which led to regulatory arbitrage—and a potential race-to-the-
bottom—as large banks located offices and assets in countries with 
the weakest regulatory systems. The central banks of the G-10 
countries sent representatives to Basel, Switzerland, to hash out 
regulatory standards acceptable to all. The result was the 1988 Basel 
Accord (“Basel I”), which regulators agreed to apply to domestic 
banking systems.41 
 
 In the United States, banking regulators implemented the new 
capital rules over several years (although for simplicity I will call 
them the 1989 regulations).42 The 1989 regulations now 
distinguished Tier 1 (instead of primary) and Tier 2 (instead of 
secondary) capital. While the definitions differed slightly, the details 
do not concern us.43 The regulations also created a risk-weighting 
41 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf (last visited Aug 24, 2014). . The focus of 
this paper is U.S. regulation, and so I will discuss the Basel accords only insofar as 
they intersect with my topic. There is a large literature on the Basel agreements; 
see, e.g., Charles Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A 
History of the Early Years, 1974-1997 (2011); Tarullo, supra note __. 
42 Capital; Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4186-01 (Jan. 27 1989); 
Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4168-01 (Jan. 27 1989); Capital 
Mainenance; Final Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 54 Fed. Reg. 11500-
01 (Mar. 21 1989). 
43 Among other things, there was a limit to how much Tier 2 could be used in total 
capital. See Differences in Capital and Accounting Standards Among the Federal 
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system for assets. Assets received a risk-weight of 0, 0.2, 0.5, and 1, 
with the safest assets (like U.S. treasuries) receiving the lowest 
number, and riskiest assets (like ordinary loans) receiving the 
highest number. When calculating the denominator of the capital-
asset ratio, the regulator would add together each asset multiplied by 
its risk weight. For example, a bank with $100 in U.S. treasuries and 
$100 in regular loans would have risk-weighted assets of $100. A 
bank with no treasuries and $200 in regular loans would have risk-
weighted assets of $200. The higher denominators for the second 
bank with riskier assets would result in a lower capital ratio. The new 
minimums are in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: 1989 Capital Adequacy Regulations 
 
Ratio 1990 1992 
Tier 1 3.25% 4% 
Tier 1 + Tier 2 7.25% 8% 
Tier 1 leverage 
ratio 
(unweighted) 
3% 3% 
  
The 1989 regulations phased in progressively stricter rules over 
several years, as shown in Table 3. They also introduced a separate 
minimum leverage ratio. The leverage ratio is the ratio of tier 1 equity 
to the sum of unweighted assets.44 It thus served as an additional 
cushion that ensured that a bank that tried to game the risk-
weighting system by accumulating low-weighted assets that were in 
fact relatively risky would nonetheless have sufficient capital. 
 
 Basel I was regarded as excessively crude from the start.45 
Among other problems, the four-basket risk-weighting system bore 
little relationship to reality. Consider a bank that has loaned 
$100,000 to a family to buy a home and has bought $100,000 in 
municipal bonds. The mortgage will typically receive a risk-weighting 
of 50% while the municipal bond investment will receive a risk-
weighting of 20%. But it is highly unlikely that the mortgage is 
precisely 2.5 times riskier than the bond investment. The mortgage 
may well be exceptionally safe because the homeowner is wealthy 
Banking and Thrift Agencies; Report to Congressional Committees, 55 Fed. Reg. 
34339-02 (Aug. 22 1990). 
44 See supra note __. 
45 See Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 576, supra note __. 
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and the value of the house is much greater than the loan. The bond 
investment may be risky because the city’s finances are in disarray. 
To address this problem, central bankers met in Basel again, and 
reached a new agreement—known as Basel II—in 2004.46 
 
 Basel II contained numerous innovations, most of which were 
never implemented by national regulators. Its most important legacy 
was the introduction of exemptions for large sophisticated banks 
from the Basel I system, which were permitted to use computer 
models to estimate their exposure to various types of risks. 
Regulators had actually permitted banks to use these models since 
the 1990s, but Basel II formalized this approach. Banks had 
developed computer models that they used for internal risk-
management. These models used data from a bank’s lending 
business, plus economic data, to generate predictions about the 
bank’s financial position in response to various shocks—such as 
interest rate spikes, sovereign debt defaults, housing price declines, 
and so on. In 2007, U.S. regulators implemented this new regime.47 
 
 These rules were implemented just in time for the 2007-2008 
financial crisis, which revealed that banks were undercapitalized. 
Central bankers repaired to Basel to negotiate a new agreement 
(Basel III),48 and Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act.49 After the 
dust settled, the regulators issued the rules in Table 4, which are 
based on Basel III.50 
 
Table 4: 2013 Capital Adequacy Regulations 
 
Tier 1 6% 
Tier 1 + Tier 2 8% 
46 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (June 2004), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf (last visited Aug 24, 2014). 
47 See 72 FR 69288-01, 69294. The Tier 1 leverage ratio was later increased to 4 
percent in 2006. 
48 Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking 
Systems – Revised Version (June 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2014). 
49 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). For a critical view, see Viral V Archaya & Matthew 
Richardson, Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, 4 Ann. Rev. Fin. Econ. 1, 31-33 
(2012). 
50 Regulatory Capital Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 62018-01 (Oct. 11, 2013) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 3, 5, 6, 165, 167, 208, 217, and 225). 
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Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 4% 
Common equity Tier 1 4.5% 
 
In addition to raising Tier 1, the 2013 regulations introduced the 
common equity Tier 1 category, which includes only common equity 
(hence excluding certain types of preferred equity in Tier 1). The 
2013 capital rules also introduced a range of additional safeguards, 
including a capital conservation buffer requirement that prohibits 
banks from issuing dividends when doing so brings them too close to 
the capital floors. The buffer requirement effectively raises the 
capital requirement another 2.5 percentage points.51 
 
 And so we conclude our whirlwind tour of the history of 
capital adequacy regulation. Some caveats bear emphasis. I have 
suppressed a large amount of detail and some variation among the 
regulators. Some of the rules in the tables above do not apply to 
certain types of banks or bank-related institutions; in particular, 
globally systemically important financial institutions are governed by 
additional rules.52 Regulators phased in the rules over different 
periods of time.53 They engaged in greater and lesser forms of 
regulatory forbearance toward banks that dipped close to the floors 
or even fell below them. Indeed, enforcement is a source of a great 
deal of variation, as regulators have the discretion to demand that 
banks exceed capital requirements, and frequently do.54 They 
amended their rules at various times in ways that I have skipped 
over. They no doubt used their judgment in different ways in 
evaluating assets. But the overall picture should by now be roughly 
clear. 
 
 
 
 
 
51 Id. at 62033. 
52 See Financial Stability Board, Update of Group of Global Systemically Important 
Banks 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121031ac.pdf. 
53 For the phase-in rules for the 2013 regulations, see Office of the  Comptroller of 
the Currency, New Capital Rule Quick Reference Guide for Community Banks 
(2013). 
54 For a valuable empirical study of enforcement practices, see Julie Anderson Hill, 
Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 Ind. L.J. 645, 
708 (2012) (finding great variation in capital-asset ratios demanded by regulators 
in enforcement actions). 
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III. HOW DID REGULATORS CHOOSE (AND JUSTIFY)  
THE CAPITAL ADEQUACY RULES? 
 
A. The Regulators’ Explanations 
 
 We focus now on the justifications the regulators provided for 
the capital adequacy rules and their revisions of those rules. At the 
start, they provided hardly any justification at all. The FDIC and the 
Fed (acting also on behalf of the OCC) issued terse 3-page statements 
announcing the 1981 regulations consisting of boilerplate about the 
importance of objective and consistent standards for ensuring the 
financial health of banks, and emphasizing that capital adequacy 
would remain only one of a number of factors that regulators 
evaluate.55 These statements did not explain why capital adequacy 
rules were an appropriate approach to bank regulation, nor why the 
regulators chose the minimum capital levels that they did. 
 
 The OCC, as a non-independent regulatory agency, was 
subject to Executive Order 12,291, which required regulatory 
agencies in the executive branch to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of 
all proposed “major regulations,” those that are expected to have an 
economic impact of at least $100 million annually.56 The order did 
not extend to independent agencies like the Fed and FDIC. The OCC 
addressed Executive Order 12,291 in a separate document, in which 
it argued that a cost-benefit analysis was not necessary because the 
rule would not have an impact of $100 million per year or more.57 
The reason was that the effect of the regulation—to increase the book 
value of aggregate capital of national banks by less than five 
percent—represented “only a reclassification of already existing 
categories of funds.”58 It is not at all clear what this means. 
 
 The OCC also said that because the capital-asset ratios of 
national banks would increase as a result of the rule, they will be able 
to “compete more aggressively for funds” and make larger loans to a 
single borrower.59 Again, it is not clear what the OCC meant. It might 
have meant that banks with larger capital-asset ratios would be able 
55 46 Fed. Reg. 62693-02, supra note ___ (FDIC); 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 33, supra note 
___ (Fed and OCC). 
56 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981). 
57 Interpretive Rulings; National Banks; Definition of Capital, 48 Fed. Reg. 56359-
01 (Dec. 21 1983). 
58 Id. at 56363. 
59 Id. 
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to borrow at a lower rate of interest and obtain economies of scale in 
lending, but if this were true, then banks would voluntarily improve 
their capital-asset ratios. The OCC did not acknowledge that the rule 
might impose costs on banks. 
 
 In a later document the Fed explained that the 1981 rules were 
driven by “[c]oncern about the decline in the ratio of capital to bank 
assets before 1981.”60 In the 1970s, the banking system experienced 
stress as a result of high inflation and low economic growth.61 A 
number of banks failed and the capital/asset ratio of the industry 
declined.62 Regulators decided that by incorporating capital 
standards in a rule, they would encourage banks to strengthen their 
balance sheets. But the later document also did not explain the basis 
of the minimum capital levels that they chose. The bare fact that 
capital levels declined is not by itself cause for alarm: perhaps, they 
were already too high relative to the social optimum. Indeed, bank 
capital levels were significantly higher in the nineteenth century than 
today;63 it may well be the case that they can be allowed to decline as 
banks develop more sophisticated methods for minimizing risk or 
diversifying their portfolios. 
 
 In 1985, the regulators revised the capital rules in response to 
the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, which ordered 
regulators to “cause banking institutions to achieve and maintain 
adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital for such 
banking institutions and by such other methods as the appropriate 
Federal banking agency deem appropriate.”64 The statute was passed 
after the Latin American debt crisis, which revealed that some U.S. 
banks were heavily exposed to risky foreign debt. Congress 
accordingly endorsed the move toward capital adequacy rules and 
also encouraged regulators to strengthen them. 
 
60 Membership of State Banking Institutions; Bank Holding Companies and 
Change in Bank Control; Capital Maintenance; Rules of Procedure, 50 Fed. Reg. 
16057-01, 16057 (Apr. 24, 1985). 
61 Allan H. Meltzer, Origins of the Great Inflation, 87 Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis 
Rev. 145 (2005). 
62 See Susan Burhouse et al., Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: 
Moving Forward, Looking Back, FDIC FYI (Jan. 14, 2003), 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/011403fyi.html (last visited July 
30, 2014). 
63 See Admati et al., supra note __. 
64 ILSA, supra note ___, 12 U.S.C. § 3907. 
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 Congress did not tell the regulators what the new capital 
requirements should be, leaving the regulators the discretion to pick 
specific numbers. The regulators did not explain why they chose 5.5% 
for primary capital and 6% for total capital. The regulators did note 
that the new levels would not affect most banks. As the Fed 
explained, 
 
Based on the most recent available data, only 17 state member banks and 61 
bank holding companies with assets over $150 million have primary capital 
ratios (without deducting intangible assets) below the 5.5 percent minimum 
primary capital guideline. Thus, fewer than 2 percent of all state member 
banks and 8 percent of all holding companies with assets over $150 million 
had primary capital ratios below the minimum benchmark. With respect to 
total capital, 25 state member banks and 80 bank holding companies have 
total capital ratios (without deducting intangibles) below the 6.0 percent 
minimum guideline.65 
 
Similarly, the FDIC observed that “almost 96% of the banks in the 
nation [will not be] impacted by this regulation.”66 The OCC also 
emphasized that few of the national banks that it regulated would be 
affected by the new rules.67 
 
This time, the OCC conducted a cost-benefit analysis under 
Executive Order 12,291.68 The OCC stated that 72 national banks had 
a shortfall of at least $1.8 billion in primary capital; 66 of those 
banks, plus another 54, had a shortfall of at least $1.3 billion in 
secondary capital; and that 389 banks met the minimums but faced 
risks that required them to raise their capital ratios. These banks 
would thus incur underwriting costs of up to $185 million, and in the 
meantime might need to reduce dividend payments. 
 
This accounting of the costs is seriously deficient. The 
underwriting costs are obviously trivial—this is just the cost of paying 
an investment bank to underwrite a stock offering. The reduction in 
dividends—that is, the lost profits—would be the major impact of the 
regulation, but the OCC did not estimate it. Thus, it failed to 
recognize most of the costs of regulation. 
 
65 50 Fed. Reg. 16057, supra note ___ at 16059. 
66 Capital Maintenance, 50 Fed. Reg. 11128-01, 11130 (Mar. 19 1985). 
67 Minimum Capital Ratios; Issuance of Directives, 50 Fed. Reg. 10207-01, 10208 
(Mar. 14 1985). 
68 Id. at 10215. 
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 The OCC argued that the benefits of the regulation would be 
greater solvency for the banks; increased stability of the financial 
system; and increased “capacity to fund economic growth.”69 The 
OCC did not estimate these benefits.70 Thus, although the OCC for 
the first time made an effort to identify in a qualitative sense the 
costs and benefits of a minimum capital adequacy regulation, it did 
not estimate (quantitatively) any of the benefits or the relevant costs. 
 
 In 1989, the regulators introduced risk-based capital rules in 
the wake of Basel I. The purpose of these standards was to provide a 
more accurate assessment of bank health by rewarding banks with 
low-risk assets. The regulations also attempted to take account of off-
balance sheet liabilities.71 The regulators did not mention any 
concern about existing capital levels; the goal was to provide a more 
appropriate measure of financial solvency rather than to strengthen 
standards. The OCC did not conduct a cost-benefit analysis because 
it did not believe that the rule was a “major rule,” that is, a rule 
creating costs of $100 million per year or more.72 It did not explain 
why, but the most likely reason is that it believed that the rule 
created net benefits for banks by releasing them from excessively 
rigid capital adequacy regulations. The Fed and FDIC noted that 
while the regulation would impose some new reporting 
requirements, it would not require banks to raise capital.73 
 
 Similarly, in 2007 the regulators adjusted the risk-based rules 
by allowing a subset of banks to use internal valuation methods to 
determine the appropriate capital-asset ratio in light of the credit risk 
of their loans, but did not intend to strengthen them.74 In a joint 
statement the regulators discussed the costs and benefits of the new 
rule. The regulators estimated a total cost of $489.9 million for 
implementing the new rules—including expenses by regulators as 
well as by banks.75 This amount of money is pocket change for the 
banking industry, and does not reflect the major impact of capital 
69 Id.  
70 Id. 
71 54 Fed. Reg. 4186. 
72 54 Fed. Reg. at 4177. 
73 54 Fed. Reg. at 11509 (FDIC); 54 Fed. Reg. at 4197 (Fed). 
74 72 Fed. Reg. at 69295.  
75 Id. at 69393. 
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regulation, which, by putting a limit on lending, reduces profits.76 It 
may have been the case that the regulators did not expect the 2007 
regulations to reduce profits but instead would increase profits by 
liberating banks from the arbitrary rules then in effect.77 If so, 
however, the regulators did not quantify this benefit. The regulators 
listed other benefits without quantifying them, including better 
capital allocation, reduction of regulatory arbitrage, better 
coordination across countries, and so on.78 
 
 Finally, with the party over in 2013, the regulators raised 
capital adequacy requirements. As the Fed/OCC joint statement 
observed, “the recent financial crisis demonstrated that the amount 
of high-quality capital held by banking organizations was insufficient 
to absorb the losses generated over that period.”79 The regulators do 
not appear to have released a formal cost-benefit analysis, but their 
joint statement refers to, and appears to rely on, a pair of cost-benefit 
analyses that were conducted by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS),80 which I will discuss momentarily. But two 
passages in the joint statement are of interest. 
 
 First, as before, the regulators observe that the new 
regulations will not affect most banks. 
 
The agencies’ analysis also indicates that the overwhelming majority of 
banking organizations already have sufficient capital to comply with the final 
rule. In particular, the agencies estimate that over 95 percent of all insured 
depository institutions would be in compliance with the minimums and buffers 
established under the final rule if it were fully effective immediately.81 
76 See Shekhar Aiyar et al., Does Macro-Pru Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy 
Experiment 16-20 (NBER Working Paper No. 17822, 2012) (finding regulated 
banks decrease lending in response to increased capital requirements). 
77 One important aspect of this argument is that banks face competition from the 
shadow banking system. See Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Do Strict Capital 
Requirements Raise the Cost of Capital? Banking Regulation and the Low Risk 
Anomaly 31 (NBER Working Paper No. 19018, 2013) (arguing that capital 
requirements do raise capital costs, which disadvantages regulated banks to the 
benefit of the shadow banking system). 
78 72 Fed. Reg. at 69391. 
79 Regulatory Capital Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 62018-01, 62021 (Oct. 11 2013). 
80 An Assessment of the Long-term Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and 
Liquidity Requirements, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf (last visited July 
30, 2014); Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition to Stronger 
Capital and Liquidity Requirements, http://www.bis.org/publ/othp12.pdf (last 
visited July 30, 2014). 
81 78 Fed Reg. 62018-01 at 62026. 
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The FDIC makes a similar statement.82 These statements are 
astonishing in light of the severity of the financial crisis and its effect 
on the economy. If banks were undercapitalized prior to 2007-2008, 
and their undercapitalization either caused or exacerbated the 
financial crisis, as is widely believed,83 then how could it be the case 
that corrective regulations would affect hardly any banks?84 
 
 Second, the regulators note that one of the major costs of the 
regulation is that when banks switch from debt to equity, they will 
lose tax benefits.85 However, the loss of tax benefits is not a social 
cost that would be included in a cost-benefit analysis—the higher tax 
bills for the bank are just a transfer to the public. Thus, these tax 
costs are irrelevant. 
 
 The BCBS produced a lengthy and sophisticated cost-benefit 
analysis that relied heavily on the academic literature.86 The major 
benefit of capital adequacy regulations is that they reduce the 
probability of a financial crisis. To calculate the probability of a 
financial crisis, the BCBS looked at historical data. A financial crisis 
occurs in a country once every 20 to 25 years, or with an average 
annual probability of 4.5%. When a banking crisis occurs, the 
economy typically goes into recession; thus, the major effect of a 
banking crisis is lost economic output. A comparison of studies 
indicate that the median loss is 63% of GDP. Using these figures, the 
BCBS calculated the expected social benefit from reducing the 
probability of a financial crisis by one percent as approximately 0.2% 
of GDP per year. The BCBS also estimated the effect of a change in 
capital requirements on the probability of the crisis. The probability 
82 Regulatory Capital Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 55340-01, 55467 (Sept. 10 2013) 
83 Admati & Hellwig, supra note __, at 184-85; FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Report, available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf 230 (July 30, 2014). 
84 A related puzzle is why banks held excess of the required minimums. See 
Franklin Allen et al., Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation, 24 Rev. 
Fin. Stud. 983, 1006 (2011) (arguing that bank competition leads banks to increase 
capital above required minimums). It is important to note, as Allen et al. do, that 
holding capital above the minimum requirements does that necessarily mean that 
banks are adequately capitalized. 
85 78 Fed. Reg. 62018-01 at 62153. 
86 It is divided in two documents; see An Assessment Of The Long-Term Economic 
Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements, supra note __; and 
Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition To Stronger Capital and 
Liquidity Requirements, supra note __. 
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and severity of a financial crisis decline at a decreasing rate as bank 
capitalization increases. 
 
 The major cost of capital adequacy regulations is the 
constraint on banks’ flexibility in choosing financing arrangements 
that maximize profit. If banks must maintain a capital-asset ratio, 
then they cannot take on too much debt, and must issue equity 
instead.87 The BCBS assumes that the cost is passed on to customers, 
who must pay higher interest rates for loans or borrow less money.88 
Thus, the question is the economic impact of an increase in lending 
costs. With this information, the net benefits of different capital 
ratios can be estimated. Using varying assumptions, the BCBS 
estimates optimal capital ratios in the range of 10-15% using a 
specific definition of capital that is not used by U.S. regulators.89 
Translated into U.S. legal definitions, a mid-range 12% ratio under 
BCBS definitions implies a Tier 1/total assets ratio of 7.6%; a Tier 
1/risk-weighted assets ratio of 13.2%, and a total capital/risk-
weighted assets ratio of 15.6%.90 
 
 The BCBS report expresses a great deal of caution in its 
recommendations. Historical data on financial crises are sparse, and 
because economic conditions are always changing, and different legal 
and economic systems prevail in different countries, there are limits 
to what one can extrapolate from that data.91 Moreover, the BCBS 
could not quantify numerous costs and benefits, for example, the 
possibility that higher capital requirements reduce economic 
volatility. Academics have criticized the BCBS for making more 
precise estimates of costs than were justified by existing studies,92 
and for assuming that the historical cost of raising equity under weak 
capital requirements provides an accurate basis for estimating the 
future cost if all banks are required to raise additional capital.93 
Nonetheless, the BCBS study is significantly more illuminating and 
87 Similarly, capital requirements reduce a bank’s ability to raise liquidity. See 
Skander J. Van den Heuvel, The Welfare Cost of Bank Requirements, 55 J. 
Monetary Econ. 316 (2008). 
88 The BCBS also includes in the cost-benefit analysis the effect of increased 
liquidity requirements in Basel III. 
89 See BCBS Assessment of the Long-term Economic Impact, supra note ____, at 
29, table 8.  
90 See id., at 57, Table A5.1. 
91 For a discussion and critique, see Coates, supra note __. 
92 Coates, supra note __ at 69. 
93 Admati et al., at __. 
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useful than the published explanations that U.S. regulators 
produced. 
 
 The BCBS ratios are considerably higher than the final Basel 
III rules,94 which are being phased in by U.S. regulators. Recall that 
the Tier 1 ratio was only 6% (rather than the BCBS’ 13.2%), and the 
total ratio was only 8% (rather than the BCBS’ 15.6%). Part of the 
explanation for the difference is that US regulators chose to 
incorporate part of the capital ratio in the form of capital buffer 
requirements, which effectively raise all the rules by 2.5 percentage 
points.95 An additional surcharge of up to 2.5 percentage points for 
globally systemic important institutions further increases the ratios 
for those institutions.96 Other differences may be due to different 
definitions; however, I have not found a clear explanation.97 
 
B. Lessons 
 
 Regulators raised capital requirements slowly and reluctantly 
from 1981 to 2013, while at the same time increasing their 
complexity. The increase in complexity was clearly a response to the 
problem of regulatory arbitrage. Crude bright-line rules are easy to 
administer but invite evasion, resulting in banks that are excessively 
risky relative to the goals of those rules.98 The real puzzle is why the 
regulators did not increase capital regulations more aggressively.99 
94 It is not clear why the final Basel III rules are less demanding than the ratios 
recommended by BCBS’s cost-benefit analysis. See Ranjit Lall, From Failure to 
Failure: The Politics of International Banking Regulation, 19 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ. 
632, 633 (2011). 
95 78 Fed. Reg. at 62033, supra note __. 
96 See Financial Stability Board, supra note __, available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121031ac.pdf.  
97 As discussed by Paul Tucker, the cumulative effect of these requirements, taking 
into account the various loopholes in Basel I, was to increase capital requirements 
for systemically important institutions by as much as ten times. See Paul Tucker, 
Capital Regulation in the New World: The Political Economy of Regime Change 
(unpub. m.s., 2014). 
98 On complexity, rules, and standards for financial regulation, see Prasad 
Krishnamurthy, Rules, Standards, and Complexity in Capital Regulation, J. Legal 
Stud. (forthcoming). See also Ran Duchin & Denis Sosyura, Safer Ratios, Riskier 
Portfolios: Banks’ Response to Government Aid, 113 J. Fin. Econ. 12 (2014) 
(finding that banks receiving government support tended to shift toward riskier 
assets within the same asset class). 
99 One response by the regulators might be that while ratios have not increased 
drastically, the definitions of Tier 1 and equity capital have become more strict. See 
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 To see why this is a puzzle, recall that as a matter of theory, 
capital regulations should constrain the behavior of banks because, 
in the absence of regulation, banks maximize profits by making loans 
and investments that are riskier than what is socially optimal.100 
These incentives are possessed by all banks, including the best-
managed, not only by poorly managed or marginal banks. Moreover, 
the magnitude of this effect is significant. The BCBS cost-benefit 
analysis suggests that optimal capital ratios are significantly higher 
than those implemented by regulators. Academics have conducted 
their own cost-benefit analyses, and an emerging consensus indicates 
that optimal capital rules may be even stricter than those 
recommended by the BCBS.101 
 
 Yet U.S. regulators took pains, even as late as 2013, to argue 
that their regulations would affect very few banks, only the bottom 
5% or so. Historical data bear out this claim. Figure 2, which shows 
the average ratio of capital to assets of U.S. banks since 1950, 
provides no evidence that new capital regulations changed banks’ 
portfolios. Empirical studies confirm that U.S. capital adequacy rules 
have not affected the capital-asset ratios of banks.102 The ratios in 
those rules were too low, or the rules were too easy to arbitrage. 
Many banks did increase their capital-asset ratios at various times, 
for example in the 1990s, but this was in response to market forces, 
not to capital adequacy rules.103 The capital adequacy rules were like 
200 mph speed limits that no one exceeds because their cars cannot 
drive so fast. 
 
Martin Feldstein, What Powers for the Federal Reserve?, 48 J. Econ. Lit 142 
(2010). 
100 See Part I, supra. 
101 See sources cited in supra note __; Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Capital, 
Harv. Bus. Rev. (forthcoming 2014). 
102 See, e.g., Mark J. Flannery & Kasturi P. Rangan, What Caused the Bank Capital 
Build-up of the 1990s?, 12 Rev. Finance 391, 423 (2008) (finding no statistically 
significant relationship between capital rules and capital-asset ratios of bank 
holding companies in the 1980s and 1990s); Reint Gropp & Florian Heider, The 
Determinants of Bank Capital Structure, 14 Rev. Finance 1 (2010) (capital 
regulation did not affect capital-asset ratios in the 1990s and early 2000s). These 
articles cite an extensive literature on this topic. See also Tarullo, supra note __, at 
141-42. There is also an extensive literature on why market forces cause banks to 
hold capital beyond regulatory limits; for an example, see, e.g., Allen, et al., supra 
note __. 
103 See Allen, Elena Carletti, et al., supra note __. 
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Figure 2: Bank Capital-Asset Ratios  
and Legal Requirements104 
 
 
 
 As noted above, the introduction of risk-weighting was 
apparently motivated by worries that unweighted capital-asset rules 
were excessively crude and invited arbitrage. But risk-weighting was 
itself a crude response to this problem. As Prasad Krishnamurthy 
shows, it would have been possible for regulators to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis of risk-weighting.105 If they had, they might well have 
decided to forgo it because of the equivocal evidence that it could 
enhance the financial health of banks. Yet they did not engage in 
rigorous cost-benefit analysis, and effectively weakened capital 
requirements by enabling banks to classify high-risk assets as low-
risk.106 
104 Capital and asset data are from http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/. The figure should 
be taken with many grains of salt. It shows only equity capital over total 
unweighted assets, aggregates different types of commercial banks. Finally, as 
noted in text, while minimum capital rules did not exist prior to 1981, regulators 
did take account of capital-asset ratios when evaluating the financial health of 
banks. The empirical studies cited in note __ provide a more rigorous analysis. 
105 Krishnamurthy, supra note ___. 
106 Admati & Hellwig, supra note __, at __. 
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 All of this suggests that if regulators had used cost-benefit 
analysis, they would have produced stricter capital-adequacy rules, 
which would have caused banks to raise capital-asset ratios. Because 
inadequate capitalization contributed to the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis,107 the failure to use cost-benefit analysis probably increased 
the severity of that crisis.108 Hence, contrary to the usual charge that 
cost-benefit analysis blocks regulation,109 in the area of finance cost-
benefit analysis would have advanced regulation.110 
 
 Why didn’t regulators use cost-benefit analysis? What were 
they doing instead? We turn to these questions in Part IV. 
 
 
IV. NORMING AS A REGULATORY STRATEGY IN BANKING LAW 
 
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis, Feasibility Analysis, and Norming 
 
 What is the explanation for the financial regulators’ choices of 
minimum capital levels?111 The regulators obviously believed that a 
relatively high capital-asset ratio is an important mark of the 
financial health of banks. This belief is at least plausible; most 
economists agree.112 But that is only the beginning of the inquiry. The 
question is how to determine the right levels for capital adequacy 
requirements. 
 
 One hypothesis is that the regulators chose the socially 
optimal capital-asset requirements in light of the information 
available at the time, based on formal cost-benefit analyses or at least 
informal cost-benefit reasoning. As we have seen, the OCC produced 
107 Admati & Hellwig, supra note __, at 184-85; FCIC, supra note __, at 230. 
108 Another contributing factor could be that bank regulation, split among three 
main agencies in the United States, is too fragmented. See Kenneth R. French et 
al., The Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System, 
http://www.stat.unc.edu/faculty/cji/890-11/SquamLake.pdf (last visited 
9/3/2014). 
109 See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note __, at 1383-4; Thomas 
McGarrity, supra note __. 
110 An alternative hypothesis is simply that regulators believed that other 
prudential tools at their disposal were sufficient to deter bank runs and they 
deliberately chose low minimum capital rules because they did not believe they 
were necessary. 
111 I will address risk-weighting and related issues in Section D. 
112 See Admati & Hellwig, supra note __. 
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some cost-benefit analyses; the other regulators discussed costs and 
benefits; and the BCBS produced a cost-benefit analysis for the 
capital adequacy rules in Basel III. But it is doubtful that these cost-
benefit analyses determined the capital-asset rules that were 
ultimately issued. The cost-benefit analyses produced by the 
regulators were informal, addressed the wrong costs and did not 
quantify the benefits, and in any event did not appear to be done in a 
rigorous fashion and so could not justify a specific ratio. The first 
high-quality cost-benefit analysis was the BCBS’s, which, however, 
was not explicitly adopted by U.S. regulators. It is possible that 
behind the scenes U.S. regulators engaged in formal or informal cost-
benefit analysis but that seems highly unlikely given the woefully 
inadequate levels that the regulators chose before (and probably even 
in) 2013. 
 
 To understand the regulators’ behavior, we start with an 
observation that the regulations could be predicted directionally 
from data about bank weakness. The stricter rules in 1981, 1985, and 
2013 followed periods of financial instability. The rules of 1989 and 
2007, which either relaxed or maintained standards, followed 
periods of financial health. The regulators acted like a person in a 
shower who turns the faucet toward hot if the water is too cold and 
turns the faucet toward cold if the water is too hot. 
 
 Still, we need to ask why the regulator raised or lowered 
capital levels as much (or as little) as they did. A major clue is the 
repeated insistence by the regulators that the new rules affected 
hardly any banks.113 Changes would be made, but they would be 
small enough not to cause much harm to the industry. The only 
banks hurt by the regulations would be a handful of barely solvent 
banks, which would be forced to raise capital or shut down.114 
 
 This approach resembles feasibility analysis, another standard 
used by regulators to evaluate regulations. Under feasibility analysis, 
the regulator chooses the strictest level of regulation that is 
“feasible,” in the sense of not imposing excessive costs on the 
113 See Part III.A., supra. 
114 Another way of framing this criticism is that regulators adopt capital 
requirements in a microprudential way – in other words, that they aim to 
individual bank failures rather than systemic costs. See Samuel G. Hanson et al., A 
Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. Econ. Perspectives 4-5 
(2011). 
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industry in terms of job loss, bankruptcy, and factory shutdowns.115 
Feasibility analyses are often used in environmental regulation, 
where the regulator imposes the strictest possible pollution controls 
that do not cause excessive harm to industry. In a typical feasibility 
analysis, the regulator describes these effects of a regulation, and 
then justifies the regulation by arguing that these harmful effects are 
small.116 
 
 Feasibility analysis is not a rigorous style of evaluation. 
“Feasibility” is not defined; it is impossible to determine why one or 
two factory shutdowns are tolerable while four or five are not. Many 
commentators think that feasibility analysis favors regulatory 
aggressiveness.117 In environmental regulation, rules justified as 
feasible are often criticized on cost-benefit grounds.118 
 
 In banking regulation, by contrast, the style of regulation is 
significantly less aggressive than what cost-benefit analysis implies. 
For this reason, feasibility analysis seems not to be an apt description 
of the regulatory decision-procedure. Instead, regulators seem driven 
by a desire to inflict as little cost on the industry as possible—to mop 
up outliers, the riskiest banks, while leaving most banks 
unaffected.119 Moreover, regulations based on feasibility analysis 
typically impose costs on all firms in the industry even if it bankrupts 
only a few. By contrast, banking regulation imposes no costs (aside 
from reporting requirements) on all but the weakest firms in the 
industry. The banks at the middle or higher on the normal 
distribution are unaffected; for that reason, I call this form of 
regulation “norming.” 
 
B. Is Norming a Justifiable Style of Financial Regulation? 
 
 Is it possible that norming is the proper way to regulate the 
banking industry? There are strong reasons for doubt. As explained 
115 See David Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to 
Masur and Posner, 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev 313 (2011) (describing feasibility 
analysis). 
116 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 657 (2010). 
117 See Driesen, supra note __ (providing a qualified defense of feasibility analysis). 
118 Masur & Posner, supra note ___. 
119 For an explanation and critique of bank regulators’ behavior, see Jeremy Bulow 
& Paul Klemperer, Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation 11-12 (unpub. m.s. 
2013), http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/MBBCR.pdf (last visited 
9/3/2014). 
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earlier, the government’s role in providing emergency liquidity gives 
all banks an incentive to maintain an excessively risky portfolio.120 
The proper regulatory response should be to reduce this perverse 
incentive. 
 
 One could nonetheless imagine a justification for norming as a 
cautious, pragmatic form of regulation that may seem reasonable in 
the face of great uncertainty.121 Suppose that financial regulators 
know that banks have an excessive incentive to take risk, but they do 
not know the magnitude of that incentive or the risk. One possibility 
is that the risk is very small: perhaps the risk of a financial crisis is 
small and, should a financial crisis occur, the economy can recover 
quickly. Another possibility is that the risk is very large. If the 
regulator does not know the magnitude of the risk, it has no basis for 
choosing a specific degree of regulatory strictness. In addition, the 
regulator may fear unintended consequences. For example, if it 
raises capital requirements by a large amount, banks will pay less for 
deposits, and this will cause depositors to take their funds to money 
market mutual funds or elsewhere, precipitating a crisis or creating 
general economic dislocations that are hard to predict.122 
 
 The regulators may therefore adopt a cautious ratcheting 
strategy. They raise capital regulations a small amount, and then see 
what happens. If capital flees from banks, they learn that the 
unintended consequences are more severe than they anticipated, and 
can retreat. If it does not, they learn that perhaps those consequences 
may be safely ignored, and can then make plans to further increase 
the strictness of the regulation. Meanwhile, the regulation will also 
have some direct beneficial effect as it will force the weakest banks to 
shut down or raise capital. This approach has an experimental feel. 
In a climate of extreme uncertainty, it may be justified to engage in 
small steps and see what the market reaction is. This will create 
120 This has been framed as a time-inconsistency problem: because the government 
faces enormous political costs resulting from bank failures, even the toughest 
capital requirements may be relaxed when a bank is at risk of failure. See Oliver 
Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions, 
13 Amer. L. Econ. Rev. 482 (2011). 
121 On this topic, see Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions (in 
Administrative Law) (unpub. m.s. 2013); Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of 
Quantification, Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming). 
122 There is cause for regulators to worry about high capital requirements funneling 
investment to the shadow banking system. See Milton Harris et al., Higher Capital 
Requirements, Safer Banks? Macroprudential Regulation in a Competitive 
Financial System 32-33 (unpub. m.s. 2014). 
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additional information that will reduce some of the uncertainty, and 
provide the basis for additional regulation if necessary.123 The small-
step approach also helps address the often exaggerated but politically 
effective claims of regulated parties that even a little bit of regulation 
will destroy thousands of jobs or the economy itself.124 
 
 A further consideration is that banking regulators are 
responsible for the health of the banking system, while 
environmental regulators are not responsible for the financial health 
of the industries that they regulate. When a banking regulator raises 
capital requirements, it takes a risk that it will force banks to shut 
down, and then it will be responsible for ensuring that those bank 
shut-downs do not cause panic and contagion. When an 
environmental regulation drives a firm into bankruptcy, the EPA has 
no specific obligations toward that firm, its shareholders, and its 
creditors. Thus, banking regulators may have stronger incentives to 
issue regulations that leave most firms unaffected. 
 
 Norming may well be justified in a range of regulatory areas, 
but it seems inappropriate for banking regulation. Because of the 
rarity and severity of financial crises, little will be learned from 
raising standards incrementally and then waiting to see what 
happens. If no financial crisis takes place, nothing will be learned. If 
a financial crisis does take place, then significant harm will have 
occurred. Moreover, data on financial institutions is plentiful, and 
thus makes possible reasonable predictions about the effect of 
regulations on the financial system.125 
 
C. A Political Theory of Norming 
 
 The political economy of banking regulation has received a 
great deal of attention. In a recent book, Charles Calomiris and 
Stephen Haber argue that the U.S. banking system is, and has been, 
fragile because of the role of interest groups in constructing the state 
and federal legal system.126 In the nineteenth century and much of 
the twentieth century, small state banks formed a political alliance 
with populist interests that feared that large financial institutions 
123 See Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, On Experimentation and Real Options in 
Financial Regulation, 42 J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming). 
124 See, e.g., Editorial, They Keep Fighting Back, NY Times, Feb. 2, 2012, at A24 
(discussing banks’ resistance to capital regulations). 
125 See Posner & Weyl, Response, supra note __. 
126 Calomiris & Haber, Fragile by Design, supra note __ . 
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would use their economic power to harm southern and western 
farmers. This alliance resisted sporadic efforts to permit banks to 
merge and grow, enabling small banks to maintain monopoly power 
in their markets.127 After urbanization and technological 
development weakened the ability of small banks to earn monopoly 
rents in the 1980s and 1990s, consolidation took place, resulting in 
the much-feared political domination of large banks and financial 
conglomerates, which formed alliances with urban activists who 
sought cheaper credit for low-income people. The result was 
deregulation, the erosion of underwriting standards, and ultimately 
the financial crisis of 2007-2008.128 
 
 Many other scholars agree that the banking industry played a 
significant role in pushing for deregulation, which took place both at 
the legislative level and at the level of regulation.129 Congress passed 
numerous statutes that weakened the rules. These statutes included 
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act 
of 1980,130 which phased out interest rate ceilings on deposits; the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 
1994,131 which abolished many restrictions on interstate banking; 
and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,132 which eliminated the 
Glass-Steagall wall between commercial and investment banking. 
During this entire period, going as far back as the 1960s, the 
127 Id. at 158-83. 
128 Id. at 203-13. 
129 For discussions of the political economy of banking regulation, see, e.g., 
Calomiris & Haber, Fragile by Design, supra note __; Randall S. Kroszner & Philep 
E. Strahan, Regulation and Deregulation of the US Banking Industry: Causes, 
Consequences, and Implications for the Future, in Economic Regulation and Its 
Reform: What Have We Learned? 485 (Nancy L. Rose ed. 2014) (emphasizing 
interest-group competition between pro-regulation small banks and anti-
regulation big banks); James Livingston, Origins of the Federal Reserve System: 
Money, Class, and Corporate Capitalism, 1890-1913 (1986) (emphasizing populist 
distrust of banking); James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr., and Ross Levine, 
Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us (2012) (arguing that 
regulatory breakdown that led to the financial crisis was caused by ideology, the 
influence of the financial industry, the psychological biases of regulators, and the 
opacity of regulation); Simon Johnson, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and 
the Next Financial Meltdown 200 (2011) (similar). 
130 Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (Mar. 31, 1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 226). 
131 Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (Sept. 29, 1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
1811). 
132 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 1999) (codified in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.) 
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individual banking regulators also increasingly allowed banks to 
enter new markets, based on broad interpretations of the law.133 
 
 There is little doubt that banks also pressured regulators to 
reduce—or not to increase too much—capital requirements.134 Yet 
banking regulators were also under political pressure to increase 
capital requirements. As we saw, the decline in capital levels of banks 
in the 1970s, accompanied by bank failure, led regulators to increase 
capital adequacy requirements in 1981, and Congress to urge them 
forward in 1983.135 The S&L crisis in the 1980s further illustrated the 
dangers of undercapitalized banks.136 
 
 Norming as a decision-procedure can be seen as a way of 
responding to these contradictory pressures. Imagine that a regulator 
wants to avoid criticism for failing to regulate, and criticism for 
regulating too strictly. The criticism for regulating too strictly comes 
from industry, which directly bears the cost of regulation. The 
criticism for failing to regulate may come from public interest groups 
and from industries that compete with the regulated industry. 
Congress may also criticize a regulator for failing to regulate strictly 
when the law calls for strict regulation, but Congress has diverse 
constituencies, and the regulated industry as well as the beneficiaries 
from regulation will be able to influence it. 
 
These competing pressures could in some cases result in 
significant levels of regulation, as is illustrated by environmental 
regulation. Industries that pollute fight against environmental 
regulations because those regulations increase their costs of 
business. But public interest groups like the Sierra Club urge 
regulators to regulate strictly. A regulator may try to optimize 
133 See, e.g., NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 
513 U.S. 251 (1995) (approving OCC’s decision to permit banks to act as agents for 
the sale of annuities); Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2986) (approving the Fed’s 
decision to permit banks to engage in private placements of commercial paper). 
134 Johnson, supra note __, at 200 (discussing the influence of banks on 
regulators); Calomiris & Haber, supra note __, at 263-66 (same). For a discussion 
of banks’ impact on the Basel process, see Ranjit Lall, From Failure to Failure: The 
Politics of International Banking Regulation, 19 Rev. Inter. Pol. Econ. 609, 610 
(2012) (arguing that large banks had a significant influence on negotiations, which 
led to a weakening of standards). 
135 See supra note __. 
136 See generally Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, How Well Capitalized Are Well-
Capitalized Banks?, 1997 New Eng. Econ. Rev. 41. 
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between these competing pressures. Many environmental regulations 
are fairly strict, reflecting perhaps that public interest groups can 
mobilize public pressure by bringing to the attention of the public the 
harmful effects of pollution on people’s health and well-being. 
 
 In the area of financial regulation, public interest groups seem 
considerably weaker. It is plausible (though hard to demonstrate) 
that the public feels less strongly about financial regulation than 
about environmental regulation.137 The beneficial effects of capital 
adequacy regulation are far more obscure than the beneficial effects 
of regulations that reduce the amount of arsenic in water supplies.138 
Thus, if financial regulation is inadequate, it will be difficult for 
public interest groups to mobilize public pressure.139 Indeed, while 
we are all familiar with the major environmental groups like Sierra 
Club and Greenpeace, it is hard to think of the names of the groups 
that seek greater financial regulation.140 They have a blurrier public 
profile because the public is less interested in financial regulation 
than in environmental regulation, and has a weaker understanding of 
financial regulation than of environmental regulation. 
 
 Consider, for example, the difference between the public 
reaction to climate change and the public reaction to the financial 
crisis. While not everyone believes that climate change is taking 
place, it has remained in the news continuously—whenever the 
weather is bad, or a natural disaster occurs, or a new study is 
released. By contrast, the financial crisis generated Occupy Wall 
Street, which grabbed public attention about a year, and then petered 
out, long before banking regulators had completed the hundreds of 
new regulations authorized by the Dodd-Frank Act.141 Economic 
recovery seems to quell outrage about financial crises, while concerns 
about the quality of the environment persist over booms and busts. 
 
137 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 Ohio 
St. L.J. 1277, 1287-88 (1989) (describing and citing literature). 
138 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Geo. L.J. 2255, 2256 (2002) 
(describing EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate arsenic regulations). 
139 See Atif Mian et al., Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the 
Aftermath of Financial Crises, 6 Amer. Econ. J.: Macroeconomics 25, 26 (2014). 
140 Id. at 1288-90. 
141 Based on a search in Google Trends; see <script type="text/javascript" 
src="//www.google.com/trends/embed.js?hl=en-
US&q=occupy+wall+street&cmpt=q&content=1&cid=TIMESERIES_GRAPH_0&e
xport=5&w=500&h=330"></script>.  
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 There are many other differences between environmental 
regulation and financial regulation. One is that pollution is often a 
continuous problem. If smog envelops a town, everyone sees (and 
smells) it. Financial crises, by contrast, are sporadic. Twenty years 
separated the S&L crisis of the 1980s and the financial crisis of 2007-
2008. The financial industry can resist regulation by using a strategy 
of delay in the immediate aftermath of the crisis until public 
attention has wandered. Polluting industries have no such strategy. 
 
Another is that financial regulation is global while 
environmental regulation is usually a national matter.142 It is much 
easier to move money overseas than to move plants and equipment 
overseas; accordingly, excessive financial regulation can lead to 
capital flight while excessive environmental regulation will have a 
more limited effect on the regulated industry. In such circumstances, 
a certain amount of regulatory conservatism, as reflected in the 
norming approach, is easy to understand, even if it is not necessarily 
optimal. 
 
 Note also that major financial institutions gain from 
regulation to the extent that it reduces competition from marginal 
institutions. Thus, the financial industry may well be willing to 
support stricter capital-adequacy regulations that eliminate 
competition from marginal enterprises that can undercut them on 
prices. Indeed, to the extent that weak banks can spark panic and 
contagion, major banks benefit from rules that regulate the weak 
banks out of existence. It may well be the case that “norming” will be 
attractive to an agency that is captured by an industry. The industry 
uses the agency to eliminate outliers; the agency’s regulatory efforts 
are then seen by an uninformed public, to the extent that it is paying 
attention, as evidence that the agency is not excessively passive. A 
similar argument has been made about licensing requirements, 
which are sometimes seen as device used by an industry that has 
captured legislators or regulators to raise the costs of entry beyond 
what is justified by legitimate health and safety considerations.143 
142 There are a few exceptions to this generalization, including the regulation of 
chlorofluorocarbon and carbon emissions. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and 
Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2007) (describing 
treaty negotiations to address two major international environmental problems—
the ozone hole and climate change). 
143 See Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 Amer. Econ. Rev. 47, 48 (1982) 
(arguing that incumbent firms may support regulations that raise the cost of entry 
to potential competitors). 
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 The interest-group pressures that cause banking regulation to 
deviate from the social optimum are complicated, and a large 
literature already identifies ways that those pressures may influence 
specific policies, like chartering requirements, capital levels, and so 
on.144 The argument being advanced here is that those pressures may 
also affect a regulator’s choice of decision-procedure or methodology 
for evaluating regulations. Norming will appeal to any regulator that 
faces strong headwinds from interest groups because it encourages 
limited regulation that benefits most firms while harming only 
outliers—and that also wants to be seen as doing something so as to 
avoid offending Congress and the public. 
 
 One of the virtues of cost-benefit analysis is that it provides 
intellectual resources for resisting political pressure. If bank 
regulators had used cost-benefit analysis to evaluate capital 
regulations, they might have been able to resist some of the pressure 
brought against them.145 One might argue that if regulators had been 
captured by industry, they would simply have manipulated cost-
benefit analysis. But a manipulated cost-benefit analysis is a bad 
cost-benefit analysis, and evidence of such manipulation could have 
been used by forces hostile to deregulation to counter the pressure of 
the banks. It is also not clear that bank regulators were really 
captured. They may well have been influenced by ideological currents 
of the time that favored deregulation. But even deregulators can be 
influenced by cost-benefit analysis when the results are 
compelling.146 
 
144 See Macey, supra note __, at 1278. 
145 They might also not have. It is important to recognize that there was a great deal 
of controversy over what the optimal capital regulations would be. Many 
economists believed that, for example, Basel II rules were too strict or too rigid. 
See, e.g., Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, Cyclical Implications of the Basel-II 
Capital Standards 27-67 (unpub. m.s. 2003) (arguing that Basel II should have 
provided for lower standards during recessions so as to avoid exacerbating cyclical 
downturns); Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Bank Regulation and the Credit Crunch, 
19 J. Banking & Fin. 679, 690-91 (1995) (arguing that enforcement of capital 
requirements caused credit shrinkage in New England). However, I have not found 
contemporary papers that did formal cost-benefit analyses of capital-asset rules as 
opposed to pointing out various isolated empirical effects of them. 
146 A frequently cited example is the Reagan administration’s decision to support 
an ozone treaty after being shown a cost-benefit analysis that showed that the 
ozone hole produced huge costs, while regulations that would ameliorate the 
problem would impose relatively low costs on industry. See Sunstein, Of Montreal 
and Kyoto, supra note __, at 15. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 It is by now well-known that the government underregulated 
the financial industry from the 1980s to the financial crisis, and that 
the underregulation contributed to that financial crisis. The 
deregulation of the financial industry had complex roots. Banks were 
overregulated in the post-World War II period, which made it 
difficult for them to survive the economic stresses of the 1970s. Many 
of the rules—such as restrictions on branching—made very little 
sense from the standpoint of the public interest, and it was 
reasonable to abolish them. Yet no one believed that banks should be 
completely deregulated. Regulators retained their legal authority to 
regulate banks for safety and soundness, and several statutes enacted 
in the 1980s encouraged them to do so. 
 
 Basic economic principles indicated that banks will take 
excessive risks unless regulated. Indeed, the S&L crisis of the 1980s 
was a textbook illustration of the economic consequences of 
insufficient financial regulation,147 and Congress responded in 1989 
by ordering regulators to tighten the rules.148 Thus, economic 
principles and statutory mandates should have equipped regulators 
with justifications for relatively strict capital rules.149 Yet regulators 
did not issue strict capital regulations. Instead, they adopted a 
strategy of norming, which ensured that the rules did no more than 
weed out a handful of outliers. 
 
 The explanation for this behavior may be that regulatory zeal 
simply crumbled in the face of industry opposition. But another 
hypothesis is that regulators lacked an adequate decision procedure 
that would have enabled them to see that industry’s demands were 
unreasonable. We cannot re-run history and see what would have 
happened if regulators had been required to use cost-benefit 
analysis. It is possible that regulators would have conducted phony 
cost-benefit analyses (as OCC did) and the same outcome would have 
occurred. Critics of cost-benefit analysis worry that this decision-
147 See Edward J. Kane, The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did It Happen? (1989) 
(describing the regulatory failures that led to the S&L crisis). 
148 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811). 
149 As did the academic literature, which overwhelmingly criticized bank 
regulations for encouraging banks to engage in excessive risk-taking. See, e.g., 
Macey, supra note __, at 1278 & n.8 (1989) (describing and citing literature). 
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procedure encourages regulators to ignore intangible, hard-to-value 
benefits of a regulation.150 In the area of financial regulation, the 
statistical value of an avoided financial crisis may have been regarded 
as to hard to value. 
 
 But even if this criticism is valid for environmental regulation, 
it is hard to imagine that something similar could happen in financial 
regulation. In the case of environmental regulation, the 
Environmental Protection Agency typically does value the major 
hard-to-measure-benefits of regulation—namely, avoided statistical 
deaths. It ignores certain other, even harder-to-measure benefits like 
the abstract value of the continuing existence of wilderness or mild 
harms like headaches.151 The cost-benefit analyses may therefore 
understate benefits but likely not by much. By contrast, if financial 
regulators ignore the benefit of reducing the probability of a financial 
crisis, there would be virtually no benefit to financial regulation—and 
capital requirements would be reduced to zero. No one believes that 
this is the right outcome. A cost-benefit analysis requirement would 
thus compel regulators to undertake this difficult but not impossible 
valuation exercise rather than ignore it.152 
 
 The history of capital regulation also contains larger lessons 
for the regulatory state. Norming, and its close cousin, feasibility 
analysis, lend themselves to underregulation when the regulator 
faces determined opposition from industry. Neither approach 
contains the intellectual resources for justifying regulations that 
impose large costs on society. Critics of cost-benefit analysis153 and 
defenders of feasibility analysis154 should be careful what they wish 
for. 
150 Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note __, at 200. 
151 For a discussion, see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 126-27 (2006) (discussing the problem of measurement). 
152 Which is not to say that judicial enforcement of cost-benefit would have been 
justified. On the question of institutional enforcement, see Robert P. Bartlett, III, 
The Institutional Framework for Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: A 
Tale of Four Paradigms?, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming).  
153 See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note __; McGarrity, supra note __; 
Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 Colum. 
J. Envtl. L. 191, 240-41 (2004) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis indeterminate). 
154 Driesen, supra note __. 
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